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Developing U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy and
International Law: The Approach of the
Obama Administration*
Winston P. Nagan
Erin K. Slemmens†
Prior U.S. presidential administrations have developed and adhered to the nuclear weapons
policy of nuclear deterrence. This policy was largely conditioned by the Cold War and the fact that
the U.S. Cold War adversary was a major threat to U.S. security because of its nuclear capability.
The policy of nuclear deterrence worked on the principle of mutually assured destruction. It
appears to have had the effect of discouraging recourse to nuclear weapons as instruments of war.
It has also been generally perceived as a position that has an uneasy relationship with conventional
international law. Even before entering office, President Obama suggested the need for a new
1
perspective in nuclear weapons control: regulation and possible abolition. It was therefore with
much anticipation that public opinion awaited the Obama Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).
However, the report did not quite measure up to the public’s expectations. For example, the
Administration reaffirmed NATO obligations that require U.S. adherence to the policy of nuclear
deterrence, which does not represent a significant change from past policy. Nevertheless, strategic
developments in treaty commitments with both NATO allies and former Cold War opponents
imply a closer approximation with international law standards regarding the threat and use of
nuclear weapons. Therefore, while current U.S. policy generates an expectation regarding the
threat or use and abolition of nuclear weapons, it still retains an element of nuclear deterrence in its
strategic posture, which, as indicated, seems to be in tension with international law. U.S. security
strategy straddles a delicate balance between unilateral action and action consistent with promoting
and defending international law in the national interest.
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INTRODUCTION

President Obama has made U.S. nuclear weapons policy a major
area of concern for his Administration. In a widely reported speech
given in Prague last year, President Obama stated that he had a vision
that was directed at the universal abolition of all nuclear weapons as a
major purpose or goal of future U.S. nuclear policy.2 To this end, the
President committed U.S. defense resources to the tactical and strategic
imperative of a complete review of the complex issues implicated in
facilitating the realization of a nuclear weapons-free world.3
The Obama Administration has generated a multitude of initiatives,
each connected with complex strategic and tactical policies that are
critical to a credible shifting of the current paradigm and status of nuclear
weapons systems. For example, there is the critical question of how to
reduce the United States’ considerable warheads and stockpiles of
nuclear weapons. Such a goal is tied to developments for the new
strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia.4 Reduction of U.S. nuclear
arms is also connected with Obama’s directive to both strengthen and
broaden the reach of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

2.
Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by President Barack Obama
at Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic (Apr. 5, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_
press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/.
Id.
3.
4.
In April 2009, President Obama and Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev jointly
declared their resolve to “pursue new and verifiable reductions in [their countries’] strategic
offensive arsenals in a step-by-step process, beginning by replacing the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty with a new, legally-binding treaty.” Dmitriy Medvedev, President of Russia, & Barack
Obama, President of the United States, Joint Statement by President Dmitriy Medvedev of the
Russian Federation and President Barack Obama of the United States of America (Apr. 1, 2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint-Statement-by-President-Dmitriy-Medvedev-ofthe-Russian-Federation-and-President-Barack-Obama-of-the-United-States-of-America/. The United
States and Russia signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010. It provides the parties with
seven years to reduce their forces. For detailed explanation of the treaty’s limits to forces, see
AMY F. WOOLF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS—THE NEW START TREATY:
CENTRAL LIMITS AND KEY PROVISIONS (June 18, 2010).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1722808
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Weapons (NPT),5 and with President Obama’s priority of developing a
legally binding international instrument that will completely prohibit the
testing of nuclear weapons.6
Another complex issue generated by the Obama Administration’s
activities is the question of how to establish and enforce an effective
nonproliferation strategy. It is clear that the United States (in cooperation
with its partners) will have to confront the presence of nuclear weapons
in North Korea and (potentially) Iran. 7 In the continuing war on
terrorism, the United States also faces the threat that terrorist groups may
get their hands on nuclear materials and the ability to deliver and
5.
The 2010 NPT Review Conference took place in New York City from May 3-28,
2010. For information on the background to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, see PAUL K.
KERR ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS—2010 NON-PROLIFERATION
TREATY (NPT) REVIEW CONFERENCE: KEY ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS (May 3, 2010). This report
notes:
The Obama Administration has emphasized in strategy documents that it views the
NPT as the “centerpiece” of the nonproliferation regime and has pledged to strengthen
the treaty. The Administration sees a linkage between arms control and disarmament
policies and progress in improving the nuclear nonproliferation measures. The 2010
Nuclear Posture Review, for example, says that progress on arms control is “a means of
strengthening our ability to mobilize broad international support for the measures
needed to reinforce the non-proliferation regime and secure materials worldwide.” The
Nuclear Posture Review also says that the conditions for nuclear disarmament will not
be possible without stronger proliferation controls. Over the years, NPT states without
nuclear weapons, particularly from developing countries, have cited lack of progress on
disarmament as the reason they do not support further tightening of nonproliferation
rules. The ability of the Administration to garner international support for its proposals
to strengthen the nonproliferation regime may be tested at the 2010 NPT Review
conference.
Id. at 1.
6.
“The United States is committed to the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty and to its early entry into force, and we will work with the United States Senate
to help achieve advice and consent to this important international agreement.” Barack Obama,
President of the United States, Statement by the President on Indonesia’s Announcement of Its
Intention To Ratify the CTBT (May 4, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/statement-president-indonesia-s-announcement-its-intention-ratify-ctbt.
7.
The new National Security Strategy promises to:
Present a Clear Choice to Iran and North Korea:
The United States will pursue the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and work to
prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. This is not about singling out
nations—it is about the responsibilities of all nations and the success of the
nonproliferation regime. Both nations face a clear choice. If North Korea eliminates
its nuclear weapons program, and Iran meets its international obligations on its nuclear
program, they will be able to proceed on a path to greater political and economic
integration with the international community. If they ignore their international
obligations, we will pursue multiple means to increase their isolation and bring them
into compliance with international nonproliferation norms.
BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 23-24 (May
2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
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detonate them.8 For these reasons, the Obama Administration is also
taking a hard look at controlling the production of weapons-grade
materials that are crucial to the creation of nuclear bombs.9
At the widest conceptual level, any steps undermining the foundations of nuclear deterrence (for example, the maintenance of nuclear
weapons and the willingness to use them) confront rigid international
structures that were originally established within a bipolar political reality.
The traditional policy of nuclear deterrence was drafted by two principal
antagonists capable of crafting expectations of stability out of the threat
of mutually assured destruction. Contemporary relations between established
states and shadowy nonstate actors (or even between a conglomeration of
states and a radically antagonistic single state) would appear to require a
much more complicated and nuanced policy.10
Thus, the Obama Administration confronts a concept of nuclear
deterrence that must be infinitely broader than the contours of a bipolar
world. Simultaneously, any policy of nuclear deterrence would seem to
be an obstacle to the expeditious realization of a nuclear weapons-free
world; yet any constraints on the possible use of nuclear weapons by the
United States may conflict with the framework of existing international
obligations (for example, NATO agreements). In light of President
8.
In April 2009, President Obama called nuclear terrorism the “most immediate and
extreme threat to global security.” Obama, supra note 2.
9.
The 2010 National Security Strategy states:
The American people face no greater or more urgent danger than a terrorist attack with
a nuclear weapon. And international peace and security is threatened by proliferation
that could lead to a nuclear exchange. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, the risk of
a nuclear attack has increased. Excessive Cold War stockpiles remain. More nations
have acquired nuclear weapons. Testing has continued. Black markets trade in nuclear
secrets and materials. Terrorists are determined to buy, build, or steal a nuclear
weapon. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered in a global nonproliferation
regime that has frayed as more people and nations break the rules.
That is why reversing the spread of nuclear weapons is a top priority. Success
depends upon broad consensus and concerted action, we will move forward
strategically on a number of fronts through our example, our partnerships, and a
reinvigorated international regime.
OBAMA, supra note 7, at 23. In particular, the Administration “will seek a new treaty that
verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in nuclear weapons.” Id.
10. Following the first detonation of atomic bombs over Japan in 1945, fear of mutually
assured destruction by reciprocal use of thermonuclear weapons on a massive scale between the
two Cold War superpowers arguably contributed much of the peace and world order over the next
fifty-six years. Over these decades, however, an increasing number of states have acquired
nuclear weapons (as well as massively destructive chemical and biological weapons). Thus, “it
became possible for smaller states and even some non-state actors to change this security
dynamic through possession and threat of use of these more destructive weapons technologies.”
DANIEL H. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION, at xiv (2009).

2010]

U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY

5

Obama’s declared policy objectives, we undertake to explain the role of
international law in giving concrete assistance and normative guidance to
U.S. policy makers, who now proceed along a complex path toward the
goal of complete nuclear disarmament.
II.

THE RELEVANT BACKGROUND TO THE NUCLEAR AGE

In August 1945, President Truman authorized the use of atomic
weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.11 During a three-day period, two
bombs were detonated, killing more than 115,000 people (possibly as
many as 250,000) and injuring at least another 100,000.12 To this day, the
debate about whether the use of the bombs was morally appropriate (or
even consistent with international law at the time) continues to inspire
intense controversy.
During the Second World War, however, there seemed to be little to
no concern regarding the legitimacy of using the atomic bomb.13 Many
military atrocities were still occurring while the U.N. Charter was drafted.
While some might argue that the Charter was formed to prevent just
those types of atrocities, others have argued that the Charter became
obsolete precisely because it failed to anticipate the extent of the damage
that could be inflicted using weapons of mass destruction. Thus, John
Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State under President Eisenhower, made a
statement of critical importance to international lawyers when, in an
article addressing the American Bar Association, he suggested that the
nuclear age had made the U.N. Charter obsolete.14 Of course, modern
international law draws profound inspiration from the U.N. Charter, and
practice has demonstrated that even outdated prescriptive foundations of
11. Barton J. Bernstein, The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered, 74 FOREIGN AFF. 135, 147
(1995).
12. Id. at 135.
13. See id. Bernstein explains:
By early 1945, World War II—especially in the Pacific—had become virtually total
war. The firebombing of Dresden had helped set a precedent for the U.S. air force,
supported by the American people, to intentionally kill mass numbers of Japanese
citizens. The [pre-war] moral insistence on noncombatant immunity crumbled during
the savage war.
Id. at 140.
14. John Foster Dulles, The Challenge of Our Time: Peace with Justice, 39 A.B.A. J.
1063, 1066 (1953). During the formation and conclusion of the U.N. Charter, the former
Secretary of State explained: “[I]n the Spring of 1945, none of us knew of the atomic bomb
which was to fall on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. The Charter is thus a preatomic age Charter.
In this sense it was obsolete before it actually came into force.” Id. Dulles affirms that had the
delegates there known “that the mysterious and immeasurable power of the atom would be
available as a means of mass destruction, the provisions of the Charter dealing with disarmament
and the regulation of armaments would have been far more emphatic and realistic.” Id.
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international law can digest evolving problems and issues. Nevertheless,
the nuclear age played an important role in the development of the Cold
War, and Cold War imperatives tended to ignore or possibly undermine
the promise and authority of the U.N. Charter. While the real world of
effective power was dominated by two hegemons, this fact created
tensions about the role and efficacy of the U.N. Charter. We suggest that
a world of states that more widely share effective power (and are guided
by a unitary superpower that sincerely seeks to empower this constitutive
arrangement) must and will return to firm standards of international
behavior as outlined in the U.N. Charter.
From the perspective of the modern law of war, academics ask the
critical question: whether the use of this bomb, which produced damage
that exceeded any specific military objective,15 could be seen as violating
the principles of military necessity, proportionality, and humanitarian
concern. Certainly, there could be an arguable issue of lacking mens rea
for authorizing the illegal use of such bombs at the time, because these
weapons were new and had never been used before.16 In contrast, no
contemporary leader could authorize the use of nuclear weapons with
this defense. The more difficult area of analysis is in the balancing of
perceived security threats and actual peace obtained by the use of nuclear
weapons. Even with a modern sense of the catastrophic effects of the
atomic bombings in 1945, some may find a justified legal account of
those historic actions, because the use of the bombs had the direct
consequence of unconditional surrender by the Japanese. This
particularly difficult area of international law continues to focus the
world’s attention on U.S. policy regarding restraint of forces under
security threat.
As long as the precise legal implications of the use of nuclear arms
in terms of conventional law relating to the ius in bello remains
15.
So dominant was the assumption that the bomb would be used against Japan that only
one high-ranking Washington official, Undersecretary of War Robert Patterson, even
questioned this notion after V-E Day. He wondered whether the defeat of Germany on
May 8, 1945, might alter the plans for dropping the bomb on Japan. It would not.
Bernstein, supra note 12, at 138. Among other U.S. military commanders who questioned the
necessity of the atomic bombings was Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. See E.B. POTTER, NIMITZ 386
(1976) (“Nimitz considered the atomic bomb somehow indecent, certainly not a legitimate form
of warfare.”).
16. There was little knowledge of the effects of the bomb blast on human populations;
and there was less understanding of the environmental consequences (including radiation
poisoning) that resulted from its use. See CHAIRMAN’S OFFICE, U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING
SURVEY: THE EFFECTS OF THE ATOMIC BOMBINGS OF HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI 30 (June 19,
1946).
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speculative (as we explain below), the effective power process may reveal
the leader of the world’s only superpower as the key architect for rules of
nuclear engagement. Moreover, the expanding base of treaties aimed at
regulating (and ultimately abolishing) nuclear weapons would give
substantial support to the recognition of customary international law
prohibiting the threat or use (or even possession) of nuclear weapons.
Thus, the Obama Administration might contribute to the outlawing of
nuclear arms even as it maintains the position of nuclear deterrence that
the Administration’s activities aim to establish as unlawful under
international law.
III. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP
Academics have a special status in international law. They are
regarded as juris consults. Credible academic work thus has an influence
on the state of international law. Important influential work has produced
a conceptual map to better understand the framework of world order
based on the U.N. Charter and the framework of international power
underlying the creation of the Charter, which is influenced by contending
and conflicting world order systems.17 In effect, the world order systems
they described were the global process of effective power, which was
better described in terms of a bipolar world.18 In this sense, the world
17. The scholar most responsible for giving international law an important role in the
nuclear weapons issue was Dr. Emanuel Margolis. See generally Emanuel Margolis, The
Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and International Law, 64 YALE L.J. 629 (1955). Margolis’ work
generated a rejoinder. In this scholarly exchange, Margolis presented a conventional view of
international law to demonstrate the violation of international law by the United States in the
testing of its thermonuclear weapons in the South Pacific. The central thrust of his argument was
that the tests restricted the use of international waters, and these restrictions violated the
fundamental principle of the law of the sea: the freedom of the seas. Id. at 634-35. Professor
Margolis conceded that the purpose that the United States had used for closing off vast tracts of
the Pacific was driven by the fear of damage to users of the ocean in those areas. In short, the
objective was to secure humanitarian ends. Id. at 635. Margolis also made reference to the trust
responsibilities that the United States owed to the trust beneficiaries. Id. at 644-45. The U.S.
trust over South Pacific islands was of course a legal product of the U.N. Charter and, in
particular, the trusteeship system that created it. Id. Margolis thus brought a conventional view
of international law to a consideration of the lawfulness of the U.S. testing of hydrogen bombs in
the South Pacific and declared that the practice violated the letter of international law. Id. at 645.
18. The scholars McDougal and Schlei defended the lawfulness of the U.S. test in the
South Pacific on the basis of international law (see Myres S. McDougal & Norbert A. Schlei, The
Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648 (1955)),
but the view of international law that they developed is a theoretically broader and contextually
informed conception of it. In this sense, McDougal and Schlei sought to develop the discourse
about the lawfulness of the test by taking into account contextual factors that a narrow
conventional view of international law might preclude. Id. at 655-56. In their view, the rules and
principles that Margolis relies on must be seen in terms of the relevant contextual background,
and the appropriate principles of the interpretation of international legal norms. Id. at 691. In
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process of effective power had significant influence on the idea of world
order19 based on the constitutional foundations of the U.N. Charter.20
short, the approach of contextual appraisal must account for the nature of the implicit claim the
United States is making in testing these weapons in the South Pacific. That claim is based on the
background of world order tensions and conflict, which pits the democratic, rule of law-based
position of the United States against a worldview rooted in totalitarian order. Id. at 689-90. This
claim is further sustained by the necessity of security preparedness. This is the relevant context in
which the claims of the United States must be assessed against the rules of international law,
which now include broader legal standards. Id.
More than that, international law itself is not a frozen system of rules. It is a process in
which the major participants continually assert claims and defend those claims and from time to
time act on them. Id. at 656-57. A reference is made to the concept of dédoublement fonctionnel.
Id. at 657. In short, in a system of world order that is not highly centralized and specialized, states
make unilateral claims to further their interests, and would seek to justify those claims on the
basis that they are a reasonable (in this instance) security competence as judged from the
perspective of a third-party appraiser. Id. at 661.
19. Historically, the principle of “reasonableness” has been critical in resolving
competing claims to authority and control over the high seas. See id. at 660. McDougal and
Schlei concluded that the temporary appropriation of parts of Pacific high seas for safety
purposes was a reasonable use of a common resource. Id. at 661. They also point out that the
inconvenience to the populations of these islands was temporary, involved appropriate
compensation and also involved consultation. Id. at 653 n.35. It should also be noted that
fishermen who suffered radiation burns on the high seas were also compensated. Id. at 653.
These temporary and limited interferences would therefore have to be appraised against the
security importance of free world values for which the testing of nuclear weapons was an
important strategic act.
The scholarly exchange between Margolis and McDougal should also be seen as part of a
broader discourse concerning the appropriateness and relevance of international law in
international relations. Margolis’ view of international law is one that may fairly be characterized
as being somewhat legalistic and moralistic in its theoretical assumptions and methods. Two of
the most respected international relations theorists of this period provided a trenchant attack on
international law as understood in terms of legalistic and moralistic procedures and methods.
The intellectual leaders of this attack were Professor Hans Morgenthau and Ambassador
George F. Kennan. GEORGE F. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY: 1900-1950 (1951); HANS J.
MORGENTHAU, IN DEFENSE OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1951). In their view, the intrusion of international law on
foreign policy makers, which by implication include the nuclear posture, was dangerous,
inflexible and undigested utopianism. KENNAN, supra, at 95; MORGENTHAU, supra, at 33-34.
Their work generated powerful rejoinders from McDougal—Law and Power and The
Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order. According to Morgenthau, the
“state creates morality as well as law and that there is neither morality nor law outside the state.”
MORGENTHAU, supra, at 34. Morgenthau stresses that there is no consensus about the nature of
international justice and, as a consequence, there is no international society that can be integrated
in terms of principles of justice and equality as in the nation state. Id. at 38-39.
The role of universal morality and universal international law is therefore misplaced. As
misplaced morality, the proponents of legalism cannot distinguish between what is “desirable and
. . . possible” and what is “desirable and . . . essential.” MORGENTHAU, supra, at 117. This is a
view supported by Kennan as well who stated, “I see the most serious fault of our past policy
formulation to lie in something that I might call the legalistic-moralistic approach to international
problems.” KENNAN, supra, at 95. This approach would certainly strengthen the view within the
national security establishment that an important role for international law in the policy process is
misplaced. Myres S. McDougal, Law and Power, 46 AM. J. INT’L L. 102, 103 (1952); Myres S.
McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public
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Order, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 29 (1959). McDougal’s response to both Kennan and Morgenthau
was that they had a complete misunderstanding of the global system of effective power and the
possibilities and potentialities of authoritative and controlling decision as a source of critical
normative guidance and policy clarification in international relations. McDougal, supra, at 10307. Additionally, their view of international law was a view rooted in an older and limited
paradigm. The concept of international law was in our time a much more flexible instrument of
inquiry and policy guidance. Id. at 107-08.
The central contribution of McDougal in this context was to distance a contemporary
conception of international law from old-fashioned legalism and the implication in the
international context that its contributions were utopian. He sought to replace this by reframing
the theory and methods of international law away from utopianism and more towards a
framework of realism and relevance. See id. at 108. This provided flexibility and greater
creativity in the formulation of legal responses to problems in the international environment.
The McDougal and Schlei response to Margolis was based on an international law that was
sensitive to the context out of which the testing of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific had
emerged. Context thus served to underline relevance and realism and clarified in a sharper way
the policy constraints and guidelines that should inform decision making in this context.
McDougal & Schlei, supra note 18, at 691. In this sense, the response to the international
relations specialist was based on a newer paradigm of international law. See generally Richard
Falk, A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies: Prospects and Proposals, 84 YALE L.J.
969 (1975).
Moreover, the McDougal approach provided an important theory and method for appraising
the lawfulness of testing nuclear weapons in international law. The approach was sufficiently
nuanced to take a broader view of the role of self-defense in the Cold War, and it was focused on
a problem that had practical implications for policy makers. Additionally, McDougal and Schlei
made U.N. Charter expectations an important part of the professional discourse in this area and, in
this sense, they were in effect repudiating the view of Dulles that the nuclear age had rendered the
Charter obsolete. Dulles, supra note 14, at 1065-66; McDougal & Schlei, supra note 18, at 68687.
McDougal concluded the Law and Power article as follows:
It is urgently to be hoped that attacks upon law and morality which so profoundly
misconceive law, morality and power, and their interrelations, will not cause many of us
to mistake the real choice that confronts us. People whose moral perspectives preclude
the deliberate resort to violence, except for self-defense or organized community
sanction, have in the contemporary world only the alternative of some form of law. The
choice we must make is not between law and no law, or between law and power, but
between ineffective and effective law. It is a choice between the doctrines and
techniques of power-balancing designed for the problems and conditions of bygone
days, and contemporary commitments and techniques of power-balancing through
appropriate international organization that offer hope of progressive and accelerating
movement toward a unified world community—a choice in sum between, on the one
hand, illusory doctrines, “old-fashioned” diplomacy, and spasmodic resorts to
unauthorized violence, and, on the other hand, clear moral and legal commitments to
freedom, peace, and abundance which are sustained by organized community coercion
and which invoke, at both national and international levels, all the contemporary
instruments of power, ideological and economic as well as diplomatic and military.
McDougal, supra, at 113.
To a large extent, the approach of McDougal and Schlei was one that was far from Dulles’
repudiation of the U.N. Charter, but was also one with sufficient flexibility to be acceptable to the
security establishment in the United States. However, the central message of McDougal and
Schlei was that international law, appropriately understood, had a capacity to be relevant to the
discourse and policies relating to nuclear weapons systems. Despite this capacity, the effect of
such an approach to international and world order is not without complexity. Consider:
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Moreover, to provide some kind of stability in a system in which there
were pressures to confirm the U.N. Charter’s promise, and pressures to
change it under the imperatives of realism, the superpowers developed

A characteristic of a decentralized social system is that the political claims of the
powerful nation-states serve as legal precedents for other, less powerful, members of
international society. Nuclear testing by the United States and the Soviet Union created
permissive precedents that are very difficult to repudiate. Relative power plays a much
greater role in creating precedents than in repudiating them. There is a kind of
reciprocity and symmetry operative in international society, as in all social systems,
that makes the assertion by one state of a legal claim to act in a specified way available
to other states similarly situated. Such symmetry owes much to the external aspects of
the ideology associated with national sovereignty, an ideology that has contributed so
centrally to the constitutive structure of traditional international law through ideas of
the equality of states, the absoluteness of territorial jurisdiction, and the doctrine in
nonintervention.
RICHARD A FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 452 (1970).
With the death of Dulles, the extremist edge of Cold War foreign policy was ameliorated as
President Eisenhower himself took charge and proceeded to send out signals of the importance of
arms control and some form of control over the nuclear arms race. Additionally, the major
nuclear powers came to recognize that atmospheric weapons tests were diminishing in importance
to their nuclear posture. Moreover, the general concern that a prohibition on nuclear testing in the
atmosphere would also serve as a kind of indirect limit on the prospect of proliferation.
These social developments led to the adoption of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313 [hereinafter
Partial Test Ban Treaty]. The superpowers undertook to promote the importance of the Treaty and
over one hundred states became parties to it. In addition, the U.N. General Assembly, effectually
noting the change of posture of the nuclear hegemons, adopted resolutions that sought to
universalize expectations concerning nuclear weapons systems.
20. The problem of international law and nuclear weapons thus crystallized around the
view of Dulles that the nuclear weapons problem had rendered the U.N. Charter and international
law based on the Charter obsolete. Dulles, supra note 14, at 1065-66. The practice of the
dominant nuclear powers reflected a projection of nuclear weapons developments for the purpose,
so it was claimed, of deterrence. The further justification of deterrence rested on the principle of
massive retaliation or mutually assured destruction. We shall defer an international law appraisal
of these practices and the claims implicit in them. However, the world of scholarly discourse
generated a concern for the nuclear weapons issue, but a somewhat oblique form of concern.
That concern was the international law implications of the U.S. testing of thermonuclear weapons
in the South Pacific. See, e.g., Margolis, supra note 17. In retrospect, the scholarly initiative
essentially developed a wedge into the discourse concerning nuclear weapons systems. This
wedge became an important bridgehead for developing a relevant role for international law based
on the U.N. Charter.
Returning briefly to the claims which fueled the Nuclear Arms Race of the 1950s and its
reliance on the principle of deterrence and the threat of mutually assured destruction, it is possible
to conceptualize these practices as representing essentially claims on the part of the dominant
nuclear powers to exempt themselves from the letter and spirit of the U.N. Charter. Alternatively,
the dominant powers represented claims to fundamentally change the Charter expectations
relating to international peace and security in light of the technological developments in nuclear
arsenals. To the extent that deterrence is still a justification for the accumulation of massive
nuclear arsenals, in particular by the United States and Russia, this claim to change the Charter
remains a residual and important question. Problematically, the treaty obligations under NATO
appear to give some authority to the policy of nuclear deterrence in international law.
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articulate doctrines that codified their national security expectations. As
we will discuss below, the critical issue is how these national security
doctrines—which articulated and communicated the expectations of the
critical power brokers of the system—are also generating prelegal norms,
which in turn influence how international law continues to develop to
account for the problems occasioned by weapons of mass destruction.
IV. LEGISLATIVE AND QUASI-LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO THE
CONTROL AND REGULATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY LAW
In 1961, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the
Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-nuclear Weapons.21 This
declaration stated, “The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is
contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a
direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”22 The declaration
also stipulated, “Any State using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is
to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting
contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against
mankind and civilization.”23 In 1963, the General Assembly also adopted
the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1884 (XVIII),
regarding weapons of mass destruction in outer space.24 Other efforts by
the United Nations to shape international expectations regarding the
status of nuclear weapons in international law included, in 1972, the
General Assembly Resolution on the Non-Use of Force in International
Relations and the Permanent Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear
Weapons 25 and, in 1980, the United Nations General Assembly
Resolution on the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons and Prevention of
Nuclear War.26 The 1972 resolution declared the permanent prohibition
of the use of nuclear weapons and recommended that the Security
Council take steps to implement fully such a stance. 27 The 1980
resolution went further, declaring the use of nuclear weapons both a
violation of the U.N. Charter and a crime against humanity, and
stipulating that nuclear disarmament is essential for the prevention of
nuclear war and for the strengthening of international peace and
security.28
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

G.A. Res. 1653 (XVI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1653 (Nov. 24, 1961).

Id. ¶ 1(a).
Id. ¶ 1(d).
G.A. Res. 1884 (XVIII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/18/1884 (Oct. 17, 1963).
G.A. Res. 2936 (XXVII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2936 (Nov. 29, 1972).
G.A. Res. 35/152D, U.N. Doc. A/RES/35/152 (Dec. 12, 1980).
See G.A. Res. 2936, supra note 25, ¶¶ 1-2.
G.A. Res. 35/152D, supra note 26, ¶¶ 1-3.
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In addition to these General Assembly resolutions, two important
multilateral treaties were generated through the U.N. system. The first
was the NPT,29 which entered into force on March 5, 1970. The second
was the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which
concluded in New York on September 10, 1996, but which has not yet
entered into force.30
In terms of soft-law obligations, General Assembly declarations and
resolutions are emphatic about the issue of the use or the threat of the use
of nuclear weapons as being completely incompatible with the legal
values in the U.N. Charter. In this sense, the General Assembly uses its
resolutions and declarations process to shape global legal expectations
concerning the outlawing of nuclear weapons systems. It remains to be
determined what normative guidance such instruments might have in the
actual operations of national security strategy and practice.
On the one hand, the agreement between superpowers on atmospheric testing served as an important stimulus to achieve a limited but
universal legal expectation tied to the issue of prohibiting the testing of
nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. On the other hand, the two
important multilateral treaties (the NPT and the CTBT, which were both
built on the foundations of scholarly work seeking to challenge the
lawfulness of testing nuclear weapons) served to provide a broader
framework of international legal process for providing nuclear weapons.
The developments of these treaties influenced and were influenced by the
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2032(XX), Urgent Need for the
Suspension of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests.31 This Resolution noted
the mounting concern of world opinion for suspended tests.32 The NPT
and CTBT provide a firm legal foundation for establishing the important
role of international law in the control and regulation of nuclear weapons.
V.

THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT IN THE CONTROL AND
REGULATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY LAW

The earliest case that sought to test the legality of the use of nuclear
weapons emerged in May 1955, when five individuals initiated a legal
action in the Tokyo District Court against the government of Japan for
the injuries sustained as a consequence of the U.S. atomic attack on the

29. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970).
30. G.A. Res. 50/245, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/245 (Sept. 17, 1996).
31. G.A. Res. 2032 (XX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2032(XX) (Dec. 3, 1965).
32. Id. pmbl.
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cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki near the end of World War II.33 The
Japanese court provided a lengthy decision in the case. Although this
was a lower court, it received expert advice from three of Japan’s most
distinguished professors of international law. In addition, the plaintiff
witnesses directly gave evidence concerning the effects of the atomic
attack on these cities. For example, testimonial was given that “[p]eople
in rags of hanging skin wandered about and lamented aloud among dead
bodies. It was an extremely sad sight beyond the description of a burning
hell, and beyond all imagination of anything heretofore known in human
history.”34 The central point of the evidence was to establish that the
atomic bomb caused indiscriminate suffering and that the unusually
severe and grotesque pain violated the permissible limits of warfare.
Although, for procedural reasons, the plaintiffs were precluded from
recovering against the Japanese state, 35 the court provided a careful
analysis of why the use of the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were
violations of international law. In formulating the theory of liability, the
court relied on the principle that the indiscriminate bombing of an
undefended city was a violation of international law.36 These standards
the court found in the Hague regulations, which were elaborated in the
Draft Rules of Air Warfare.37 These rules restrict the right of aerial
bombardment to military objectives, specifically declaring that
“bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings not in the
immediate neighbourhood of the operations of land forces is
prohibited.”38 The court also quotes article 22, which forbids “[a]erial
bombardment for the purpose of terrorising the civilian population, of
destroying or damaging private property not of military character, or of
injuring non-combatants.”39 The court concluded that “the act of atomic
33. Shimoda v. State, Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tōkyō Dist. Ct.] Dec. 7, 1963, 355
HANREI JIHō [HANJI] 17 (Japan), translated in 7 JAP. ANN. INT’L L. 212, 212-52 (1963). The
decision was digested in 58 AM. J. INT’L L. 1016 (1964). The Shimoda v. State case garnered
attention among jurists as the first and (then) only judicial attempt to assess the legality of
atomic—and, by extension, nuclear—weapons. See, e.g., Richard A. Falk, The Shimoda Case: A
Legal Appraisal of the Atomic Attacks upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 59 AM. J. INT’L L. 759, 759
(1965) (“The decision thus offers a focus for a more general inquiry into the continuing relevance
of the laws of war to the conduct of warfare in the nuclear age.”).
34. Falk, supra note 33, at 761 (citing 8 JAP. ANN. INT’L L. 212, 214).
35. Shimoda, 355 HANJI 17, translated in 7 JAP. ANN. INT’L L. at 229.
36. Id. a 214-15.
37. Id. at 215.
38. Comm’n of Jurists at The Hague, Hague Rules of Air Warfare, in THE LAWS OF
ARMED CONFLICTS 207, 210 (Dietrich Schindler & Jirí Toman eds., 1988).
39. Shimoda, 355 HANJI 17, translated in 7 JAP. ANN. INT’L L. at 215. These rules were
among some of the first attempts to control the use of weapons that could not (for various
reasons) be banned outright. See GÖRAN LYSÉN, THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF
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bombing on an undefended city . . . should be regarded in the same light
as a blind aerial bombardment; and it must be said to be a hostile act
contrary to international law of the day.”40
The court’s conclusions were that international law forbids
indiscriminate bombing of undefended cities and that no principle of
military necessity could change this legal conclusion.41 The court also
connected the use of these weapons with the production of unnecessary
and cruel forms of suffering, analogous to the international law
prohibition of lethal poisons and bacteria.42 The atomic bomb’s effects
were more severe and more extensive than these prohibited weapons and
therefore the use of the atomic bomb was unlawful.
The critical question remains as to the effect of the Shimoda v. State
case as legal precedent. The Shimoda case is the only adversarial proceeding undertaken in a domestic court to address the legality of nuclear
warfare. In this unique case, evidence was presented on behalf of the
claimants (all victims who were either killed or maimed by the
bombings) to the Court, which (with the assistance of juris consults who
were professors of international law) rendered a carefully articulated
legal judgment.43 The case raises the implicit question of whether it is
appropriate and within the boundaries of judicial settlement to adjudicate
the issue of the lawfulness of nuclear weapons. The Shimoda case is an
important precedent for indicating that certainly a competent domestic
tribunal can render a judicially responsible and important clarification of
the law in the context of a concrete adversarial proceeding.
The Shimoda case at least establishes that the role of law may be an
important part of the larger landscape of authoritative and controlling
decision making at all levels; moreover, the fact that the plaintiffs could
give evidence directly on the effects the atomic blast had on them and
their fellow citizens was an important formal judicial record that might
influence and guide policy making in the future. It is unclear whether
Shimoda will significantly influence the status of nuclear weapons in
international law. However, it stands as an important lonely sentinel of
justice.
The role of law in the form of judicial settlement has also helped in
seeking to secure an important role for the normative guidance that
ARMAMENTS: THE LAW OF DISARMAMENT 41-48 (1990). The Air Rules were never adopted.
Comm’n of Jurists at The Hague, supra note 38, at 207.
40. Shimoda, 355 HANJI 17, translated in 7 JAP. ANN. INT’L L. at 239.
41. Id. at 252.
42. Id. at 216-17.
43. See Falk, supra note 33, at 760-61.
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international law might provide. In 1973, Australia and New Zealand
sued France in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning the
legality of French nuclear tests in the atmosphere above the South Pacific
Ocean.44 Australia and New Zealand sought relief from future testing and
a declaration that France’s testing program in the South Pacific was a
violation of international law.45
The court’s first action was to issue provisional measures to ensure
that no action would be taken which would prejudice the rights of the
other party and that the French government should avoid nuclear tests
which deposit radioactive fallouts in Australian and New Zealand
territories.46 The issuance of this order implied an important substantive
right upon which Australia and New Zealand could rely for the prevention of the infringement of its sovereignty with nuclear pollution; and this
substantive right derived from customary law rather than treaty law.
Thus, the interim order carried the implicit promise that the NPT and the
U.N. General Assembly action (in the form of resolutions and declarations) might have had a radiating effect of creating a customary rule of
international law that prohibited the testing of nuclear weapons in the
atmosphere.
In 1974, the ICJ delivered its judgment. During the period involved
in the ICJ’s interim order, a lower level official of the French government
had issued a press statement indicating that France’s testing program had
been concluded. Copies of the newspaper accounts were forwarded to
the court.47 Because the French were no longer going to test their
weapons, the object and purpose of the case (the court concluded) was no
longer at issue.48 In this sense, the ICJ did not pass on the merits of the
question and thus did not contribute to the possible creation and
clarification of an international legal norm that had the quality of an
44. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 43 (May 9); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973
I.C.J. 49 (May 14); Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v.
Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20).
45. 1974 I.C.J. at 256; 1974 I.C.J. at 460.
46. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J., ¶ 19; Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J.,
¶ 19.
47. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. ¶¶ 20, 28; Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974
I.C.J. ¶¶ 20, 26-29.
48. The Court explained:
In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be the last, the French
Government conveyed to the world at large . . . its intention effectively to terminate
these tests. . . . The objects of these statements are clear and they were addressed to the
international community as a whole, and the Court holds that they constitute an
undertaking possessing legal effect.
Nuclear Rests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. ¶ 51; Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J., ¶ 53.
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authoritative legal prescription concerning the testing of nuclear weapons
in the atmosphere.
In 1995, New Zealand again took France to the ICJ because France
proposed to resume tests of its nuclear arsenal in the South Pacific.49
However, the court declined to uphold New Zealand’s claims, making a
distinction between France’s promise to withhold from nuclear testing in
the atmosphere and the impending tests, which were to take place
underground.50 This decision continued the court’s passive stance in
assessing developing norms in international law regarding nuclear
weapons testing.
The next major development in the evolution of international legal
standards regarding the control and regulation of nuclear weapons
emerged from an advisory opinion of the ICJ on the Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.51 The triggering of the advisory
opinion came from an unusual source, the World Health Assembly of the
World Health Organization (WHO). The WHO’s concern was expressed
as follows: “In view of the health and environmental effects, would the
use of nuclear weapons by a State in war or other armed conflict be a
breach of its obligations under international law including the WHO
Constitution?”52 In December 1994, the U.N. General Assembly sought
an advisory opinion on whether “the threat or use of nuclear weapons in
any circumstance [was] permitted under international law.”53
The court handed down its advisory opinion on the above matter in
1996. The opinion covered a wide terrain of potentially applicable
international law. The court considered, for example, the possible
relevance of the arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to article 6 of the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.54 It also considered
the possible applicability of article 2 of the Convention of the Prevention
and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.55 It also looked at the law
relating to the protection and safeguarding of the environment.56 The
court concluded that the most “directly relevant” law applicable to the
49. Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the
Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.) Case, 1995 I.C.J. 288,
¶ 1 (Sept. 22).
50. Id. ¶ 63.
51. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226
(July 8).
52. Press Release, Int’l Court of Justice, Request by WHO for an Advisory Opinion:
Order Fixing Time-Limits, Int’l Court of Justice Press Release 93/30 (Sept. 13, 1993).
53. G.A. Res. 49/75K, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/75 (Jan. 9, 1995).
54. 1996 I.C.J., ¶¶ 24-25.
55. Id. ¶ 26.
56. Id. ¶¶ 27-33.
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question before it was the law “relating to the use of force enshrined in
the [U.N.] Charter and the law applicable in armed conflict which
regulates the conduct of hostilities, together with any specific treaties on
nuclear weapons that the Court might determine to be relevant.”57 First,
however, the court made a quick examination of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons.58
The court addressed several provisions in the Charter relating to the
threat and use of force.59 These include articles 2(4),60 51,61 and 42.62 The
court also noted that international law does not contain any specific
prescription authorizing the threat or use of nuclear weapons, nor are
there rules that specifically prohibit the threat or use.63 The court noted
that treaties deal largely with acquisition, manufacture, possession,
deployment, and testing of nuclear weapons.64 Thus, the proscriptive
reach of treaty laws was found to be limited, especially as certain treaties
specifically seemed to authorize recourse to the use of nuclear weapons.65
When the court examined whether customary international law
provides a source of law prohibiting the threat or use of nuclear weapons,
the court found no “customary rule specifically proscribing the threat or
use of nuclear weapons per se.”66 The court found the emergence of such
a customary rule hampered by “continuing tensions between the nascent
opinio juris . . . and the still strong adherence to the practice of
deterrence.”67
When the court examined the breadth of customary international
law for a more general prohibition relevant to the threat or use of nuclear
weapons, the court did not find “sufficient elements to enable it to
conclude with certainty that the use of nuclear weapons would
57. Id. ¶ 34.
58. Id. ¶¶ 35-36 (“[I]n order correctly to apply to the present case the Charter law on the
use of force and the law applicable in armed conflict, in particular humanitarian law, it is
imperative for the Court to take account of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, and in
particular their destructive capacity, their capacity to cause untold human suffering, and their
ability to cause damage to generations to come.”).
59. See id. ¶¶ 37-50.
60. Id. ¶ 38; U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”).
61. 1996 I.C.J., ¶ 38; U.N. Charter art. 51 (recognizing the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs).
62. 1996 I.C.J., ¶ 38; U.N. Charter art. 42 (recognizing that whereby the Security Council
may take military enforcement measures in conformity with chapter VII of the Charter).
63. 1996 I.C.J., ¶ 52.
64. Id. ¶ 58.
65. Id. ¶¶ 59-63.
66. Id. ¶ 74.
67. Id. ¶ 73.
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necessarily be at variance with the principles and rules of law applicable
in armed conflict in any circumstance.”68
Furthermore, the Court cannot lose sight of the fundamental right of every
State to survival, and thus its right to resort to self-defence, in accordance
with Article 51 of the Charter, when its survival is at stake.
Nor can it ignore the practice referred to as “policy of deterrence”, to
which an appreciable section of the international community adhered for
69
many years.

The court also reviewed the scope of international humanitarian law.70
Despite finding that the new weaponry has not been explicitly accounted
for in humanitarian law, the court did not discount humanitarian law’s
relevancy to the question.71 The critical holding by the court relates to the
importance of the self-defense/deterrence principle. The Court observed:
In view of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, to which the
Court has referred above, the use of such weapons in fact seems scarcely
reconcilable with the respect for [the requirements of law applicable to
armed conflict]. Nevertheless, the Court considers that it does not have
sufficient elements to enable it to conclude with certainty that the use of
nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with the principles and
72
rules of law applicable in armed conflict in any circumstance.

Thus, the majority of the court permits the threat or the use of nuclear
weapons in the narrow circumstance where the survival of the state is at
stake. However, the court qualified this holding somewhat by
recognizing the importance of the obligation found in article VI of the
NPT, requiring the states’ parties to negotiate in good faith the issue of
nuclear disarmament.73
The opinion of the International Court of Justice generated a
significant dissenting opinion by Judge Weeramantry (Vice President of
the Court), who took the position that the use or the threatened use of
nuclear weapons was “illegal in any circumstances whatsoever.”74 In his
view, such threat or use
68. Id. ¶ 95.
69. Id. ¶ 96.
70. Id. ¶¶ 74-95.
71. Id. ¶ 86.
72. Id. ¶ 95 (emphasis added).
73. Id. ¶ 99 (quoting the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note
29, art. VI (“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control.”)).
74. Id. at 433 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
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violates the fundamental principles of international law, and represents the
very negation of the humanitarian concerns [that] underlie the structure of
humanitarian law. It offends conventional law and, in particular, the
Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925, and Article 23(a) of the Hague Regulations
of 1907. It contradicts the fundamental principle of the dignity and worth
75
of the human person on which all law depends.

Central to Judge Weeramantry’s approach is the distillation of the
keynote values embedded in the U.N. Charter. Addressing the applicability and fortitude of the U.N. Charter, which is at the foundations of the
new world order’s legal basis, Judge Weeramantry posed the critical
question, “Did that document, drafted in total unawareness of this
escalation in the weaponry of war, have anything to say of relevance to
the nuclear age which lay round the corner?”76 The question is critically
relevant because, as Weeramantry explains elsewhere, “[t]here is an old
doctrine in international law known as the Lotus doctrine, which
represents the [premise] of that which is not prohibited is permitted.”77
However, “because you cannot in black letters enumerate all the various
kinds of conduct in this uncertain world which are prohibited,” surely
there must be “behind the black letter rules . . . an enormous array of
principles” from which one can establish that an unaddressed kind of
conduct is effectively prohibited.78 For Weeramantry, these principles are
reflected directly in the specific articles on the preamble of the U.N.
Charter. 79 These keynote principles are substantially rooted in the
concept of human dignity.80 At their essence, nuclear weapons hold such
incredibly destructive capacities that they negate the idea of law, and, in
particular, marginalize the fundamental human element, which is the
foundation of law.
Judge Weeramantry’s dissenting opinion is an illustration of Grotian
jurisprudence, which seeks to provide rules to a new world order based
on the shared experience of humanity. At the heart of the opinion is the
principle that nuclear arsenals are simply incompatible with the idea of
law, legality, and reasoned elaboration. This premise is related to a
central question implicit in this Article; namely, how far and to what
extent lawyers’ interventions (including the powerful intervention of one
75. Id.
76. Id. at 441.
77. C.G. Weeramantry, Nuclear Weapons and International Law, 9 MICH. ST. U.-DCL J.
INT’L L. 255, 257 (2000).
78. Id. For a broader explanation of the purpose of the “keynote principles” underlying
the U.N. Charter, see id. at 256-60.
79. Id. at 257; 1996 I.C.J. at 441-42 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
80. Weeramantry, supra note 77, at 257-58.
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former lawyer and legal scholar, President Obama) will improve our
understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in the context of changing
world order patterns.
Assuming that President Obama means to achieve complete
abolition of nuclear arms, what effective legal strategies may be deployed
to secure the agreed-upon objective of complete nuclear disarmament?
Is it necessary to secure simultaneously a clear, legal, and moral basis for
holding that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is quite simply a
violation of international law?
There are two vitally important technical matters that international
lawyers must resolve among themselves, and, having done so, the international lawyers must then find the means to communicate these
conclusions to both the political and the relevant technological and
scientific communities. The first matter concerns the scope of international law. Is the regime of nuclear weapons subject only to the law of
the lex specialis, or are there broader sources of law that must inform this
critical legal conversation?
In the dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry, it is strongly urged
that the range of applicable international law is not confined to the lex
specialis of treaty law. The Judge recognizes the relevant sources of law
to include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The international law applicable generally to armed conflicts—the
jus in bello, sometimes referred to as the “humanitarian law of war”.
The jus ad bellum—the law governing the right of States to go to war.
This law is expressed in the United Nations Charter and related
customary law.
The lex specialis—the international legal obligations that relate
specifically to nuclear arms and weapons of mass destruction.
The whole corpus of international law that governs State obligations
and rights generally, which may affect nuclear weapons policy in
particular circumstances.
National . . . , constitutional[,] and statutory [law], [which] may apply
81
to decisions on nuclear weapons by national authorities.

Both the majority opinion and Judge Weeramantry’s dissenting
opinion have embraced a broader view of what international law is and,
therefore, have in effect sanctioned a broader role for the international
lawyer in world order matters. In particular, Judge Weeramantry’s list of
“sources” suggests that we must broaden our base of sources in order for
international adjudication to keep abreast of the critical problems of
81.

1996 I.C.J. at 443 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
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world order amenable to judicial interventions. This is more than simply
giving article 38 of the ICJ Statute a generous construction as to the
relevant, authoritative sources of international law.82 It may be that we are
also in search of a more useful theory about the sources of international
law and how to use them.
W. Michael Reisman, for example, anticipated just such an
eventuality in his piece, International Lawmaking: A Process of
Communication, in which he sought to provide a practical perspective
drawn from communications theory about how international law is
functionally created.83 Professor Reisman suggested that attention be
given to the identity of both communicator and target audience.84 He also
suggested that from an observer’s view careful appraisal should be given
to the “authority signal,” the “control intention,” and the “policy content”
of a relevant flow of communications.85 These theoretical ideas may find
fertile ground for reflection in practical contexts of international decision
making. This, of course, impacts upon how broadly or narrowly the
lawyer’s role is conceived.
Weeramantry’s second central issue is that of interpretation.
Assuming arguendo that Judge Weeramantry is correct about the breadth
of the sources of international law relevant to the problem, what kinds of
explicit, normative guidance can the interpreter invoke regarding the
specific prescription and application of international law? Here, the U.N.
Charter preamble, as an instrument of goal guidance as well as goal
clarification, is most useful and insightful. In his dissenting opinion,
Judge Weeramantry sought to ground the problem in the context of “six
keynote concepts,” which embody the global community’s fundamental
expectations about global constitutive and public order priorities.86 These

82. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031
(entered into force Oct. 24, 1945), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p14&p2=2&p3=0.
83. W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 101 (1981).
84. See id. at 107.
85. Id. at 108.
86. See 1996 I.C.J. at 441-42 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting). The following are a summary
of the values behind the six keynote concepts found in the U.N. Charter. The opening of the
preamble expresses the first standard—that the Charter’s authority is rooted in the perspectives of
all members of the global community, that is, the peoples. This is indicated by the words, “we the
peoples of the United Nations.” Id. Thus, the authority for the international rule of law, and its
power to review and supervise the nuclear weapons problem is an authority not rooted in
abstractions like “sovereignty,” “elite,” or “ruling class,” but in the actual perspectives of the
people of the world community. This means that the peoples’ goals—expressed through
appropriate fora (including the United Nations, governments, as well as public opinion)—are
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concepts are vital if the interpretation of international law is to be guided
by explicit standards of normative understanding. In short, the
interpretation of international law (for example, its specific prescription
and application) may be rootless, arbitrary, and even quixotic if it is not
subject to explicit standards of normative guidance, which are expressed
in concrete terms in the U.N. Charter taken as a whole.
These standards may influence the strategies of legal argument and
legal justification concerning the legality of nuclear weapons. Moreover,
it would be of value for the nuclear strategists of the Obama
Administration to consider the approach of both the majority of the ICJ
as well as the dissent of Judge Weeramantry in formulating the nuclear
posture of the United States. One element of the strategy would be to
take the facts and logic of nuclear weapons and to show them in light of
these keynote concepts, after the fashion of natural lawyers, that there is
nothing reasonable in the threat of the possible extinction of the entire
eco-social process.
Another stratagem may be to give a cautious assessment of the
available corpus of law, in light of the keynote concepts, and to appeal for
caution and seriousness if states feel compelled to have recourse to
nuclear weapons, in conduct and operations that are on their face
critical indicators of the “principle of humanity” and the “dictates of public conscience” as they
relate to the conditions of war (methods and means).
The Charter’s second key concept embraces the high purpose of “sav[ing] succeeding
generations from the scourge of war.” Id. at 442. The drafters clearly did not envision nuclear
war in reference to the concept of war here. Nonetheless, as the passage contemplates the
destructiveness of war, an enhanced technological capacity for destructive weapons would
enhance the relevance of this provision, not restrict its scope. Id. This reading reflects a
reasonable legal interpretation.
The third keynote concept is the reference to the “dignity and worth of the human person.”
Id. In blunt terms, the eradication of millions of human beings with a single weapon hardly
values the dignity or worth of the human person. What is of cardinal legal, political, and moral
import is the idea that international law based on the law of the Charter be interpreted to enhance
the dignity and worth of all peoples and individuals, rather than be complicit in the destruction of
the core values of human dignity.
The fourth keynote concept in the preamble is emphatically anti-imperialist. It holds that the
equal rights of all nations must be respected. Id. Nuclear power institutionalizes hegemony
(nuclear umbrellas) and destabilizes interstate relations as states face the “need” to possess their
nuclear arsenal in order to deter the other states from contemplating the deployment or use of
their own arsenal.
The fifth keynote in the Charter preamble refers to the obligation to respect international law
based not only on treaty commitments, but also on “other sources of international law.” Id. The
entire framework of nuclear weapons perspectives and operations cannot proceed outside of the
very idea of “law,” or more precisely, the law of human survival that must be the foundational
precept of modern international law.
The sixth keynote point in the preamble of the Charter contains a deeply rooted expectation
of progress, improved standards of living, and enhanced domains of freedom. Id. Extinction or
the prospect of extinction of the human species is hardly consistent with these aims.
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ostensibly incompatible with those keynote expectations. A third
approach would be simply to acknowledge that the issue of nuclear
weapons is sui generis. To do this, one would have to ignore the
normative guidance of the keynote concepts and have a great deal more
faith in what states have actually achieved so far.
A central question that the ICJ contribution addresses is how a
major power like the United States considers the question of the
lawfulness of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The advisory opinion
allowed the court the opportunity to enlarge and focus the legal discourse
on a vital issue of world order. In so doing, the court generated
international law expectations, with an articulate juridical structure for
addressing the problem. This structure secures a process of reasoned
elaboration that is more in keeping with the Grotian tradition than the
tradition of state-dominated positivism. We believe that a more generous
interpretation of the relevant sources, including the treaty obligations,
and a restrained view of the conditions of reasonable self-defense, will
provide us with a better working picture of how we must proceed
expeditiously to approximate the Obama objective of a world free of the
menace of nuclear weapons.
A still more realistic picture of the legal character of the problem of
nuclear weapons emerges from Judge Weeramantry’s dissent. Quite
simply, nuclear weapons point to a legal limit on the capacity for
universal destruction. This view should be considered at least as an
aspect of the legal obligation of parties to the NPT to work assiduously
towards a world without nuclear weapons. In any event, the awkward
truth about nuclear arsenals is that they cannot be reconciled with the
fundamental keynote expectations of the U.N. Charter and modern
international law. They are, or should be, unlawful, and this insight
should guide future U.S. policy.
VI. THE LEX SPECIALIS AND THE UNITED STATES
The development of specific treaty obligations concerning the
control and regulation of nuclear weapons in international law may affect
the timeline for achieving a customary prohibition on the threat or use of
nuclear arms. While it appears that increasingly universal restrictions on
nuclear arms proliferation will contribute to a customary law prohibition
against obtaining and testing nuclear weapons, it also appears that those
countries that had nuclear arms prior to the establishment of the NPT
will retain the right to keep and maintain their weapons under lex
specialis.
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The most important of these instruments for the United States are
the treaties made with the USSR/Russia on the reduction of nuclear
arsenals, as well as the Partial Test Ban Treaty. These treaties are very
specific, but the critical expectation they generate is that some aspects of
nuclear weapons policy are subject to treaty-based international law.
However, the expectations substantively generated are very narrow. In
addition, there are two critical treaties of a multilateral character
generated by the international system. These are the NPT and the CTBT.
The NPT contains an implicit pact in which a small group of
international players is permitted to have nuclear weapons and the rest of
the parties to the treaties are prohibited from developing nuclear
weapons.87 The treaty does contain a loophole in the sense that, under
article IV, a state has an “inalienable right” to develop nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes.88 Such developments also close the distance
in which a state may eventually go nuclear. The NPT also contains a
provision for continued negotiation—the object of which is complete
global nuclear disarmament.89 The United States has signed and ratified
this treaty and is an active participant in the process for ensuring the
goals of the NPT. It has been suggested that the CTBT is an
extrapolation of the obligation to work towards complete nuclear
disarmament in the NPT.90
The United States was a leading force in securing the adoption of
the CTBT, and President Clinton was the first head of state to sign it.
The treaty was clearly an important complement to the NPT, since an
important practical way of preventing proliferation is to prevent testing.
If a state cannot test its nuclear arsenals, the risk to it of having untested
devices deployed would be very great. Hence, the CTBT was an
87. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 29, arts. 1-2.
88. Id. art. 4.
89. The preamble to the NPT declares the signatories’ desire to
further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States
in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the
liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of
nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
Id. pmbl.
90. Many states who negotiated the NPT believed that only a Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty could realize the objective of Article VI of the NPT. See David A. Koplow,
Bonehead Non-Proliferation, 17 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 145, 150 (1993) (“During the key
stages of the negotiations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the diplomatic representatives from
West Germany, Sweden, Canada, Japan[,] and other pivotal countries were unambiguous in
asserting that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was the crucial ‘effective measure’ that Article VI
would mandate.”).
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important step in development of global legal expectations concerning
the control and regulation of nuclear weapons systems.
When President Clinton transferred jurisdiction over the CTBT to
the U.S. Senate to secure its advice and consent for the ratification of this
treaty, a well-organized right-wing lobby worked quietly to secure a fasttracked hearing and vote for the treaty.91 The hearings were short and
perfunctory, and the vote defeated ratification of the treaty. The defeat of
the treaty sent a signal globally that the United States was moving against
international efforts to reduce nuclear arms and the threat they posed.92
In the larger scheme of world order, the defeat of the CTBT also
suggested that the United States was not committed to the use of
international law for exercising a degree of control and regulation over
nuclear weapons. Because the United States is one of the world powers
and leaders in this field, its role in shaping global expectations about the
status of nuclear weapons was to undermine the force of international
agreements in establishing new normative standards for nuclear weapons
in international law.
VII. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PRIOR PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATIONS
In general, U.S. national security policy has adhered to the principle
of nuclear deterrence. The policy of nuclear deterrence means that the
United States will threaten to use (or will actually use) nuclear weapons
against any adversary that threatens to use (or uses) nuclear, chemical, or
even massive conventional weapons against the United States.93 This Part
91. For a close examination of the “U.S. Senate’s previous rejection (and, by implication,
the nation’s non-ratification) of the CTBT,” see Winston P. Nagan & Erin K. Slemmens, National
Security Policy and Ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 32 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 2
(assessing “the political process that failed to realize the security values now imperative to U.S.
national defense”).
92. See Craig Cerniello, Russia, China, U.S. Allies Condemn Senate Defeat of Treaty,
ARMS CONTROL ASS’N, Sept.–Oct. 1999, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_09_10/reaso99
(“The Senate’s rejection of the [CTBT] . . . drew a barrage of criticism from Russia and China, as
well as from U.S. allies in Europe and Asia.”); see also Barbara Crossette, Defeat of a Treaty: The
Shock Waves; Around the World, Dismay Over Senate Vote on Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1999,
at A1 (quoting the disappointment of foreign ministers and defense ministers from around the
world); Senate Rejection of the CTBT: International Statements and Comment, ACRONYM INST.
FOR DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY, http://www.acronym.org.uk/ctbt/ctbreac2.htm (last visited Sept.
13, 2009) (expressing statements of regret and disappointment from governments around the
world); CTBT: The U.S.’ “Dangerous Hesitance” Imperils Nonproliferation Regime, U.S. INFO.
AGENCY, Oct. 13, 1999, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/news/wwwh9o13.htm (statements
from various governments expressing regret at the failure of the U.S. Senate to pass the CTBT).
93. For legal analysis strictly addressing the policy of nuclear deterrence, see Charles J.
Moxley, Jr., The Unlawfulness of the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, 8 ILSA J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 447 (2002) (assessing the lawfulness of potential use of nuclear weapons by the
United States pursuant to a policy of nuclear deterrence).
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explores the positioning of previous presidential administrations
regarding the long held U.S. policy of nuclear deterrence in light of the
widely perceived illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.
The security strategy of nuclear deterrence grew in direct response
to the Cold War. In the years immediately following the atomic
bombings in WWII, President Truman seemed reluctant to formulate a
national security policy dependent upon nuclear weapons,94 “[b]ut soon
after the first Soviet nuclear test, official national defense policy
explicitly included the possible first use of nuclear weapons.”95 Facing
increasing challenges to U.S. nuclear superiority, President Eisenhower
made a first-use doctrine explicit in the Administration’s national security
policy, stating that “[i]n the event of hostilities, the United States will
consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions.”96
For the duration of the Cold War, both preemption and nuclear overkill
would remain consistent features of the single integrated operations
plan.97 However, as the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations addressed
the increasing infeasibility of a disarming first-strike, U.S. nuclear
deterrence policy embraced the doctrine of mutually assured destruction
(MAD).98
From the end of the Cold War until the second Bush Administration,
the U.S. presidencies backed away from MAD doctrine in response to the
changing nature of threats to the United States. The U.S. nuclear
weapons policy on “no-first-use” was first presented at a U.N. Special
Session on Disarmament in 1978, and was repeated just prior to the 1995
NPT Review and Extension Conference.99 This policy disavowed the use
of nuclear weapons except in extreme circumstances, yet hedged this
disavowal against such a broad range of circumstances that U.S. nuclear
weapons were still available for first use even to preempt a nonnuclear
attach.100
94. In the Truman Administration, these weapons were viewed as distinct from
conventional weapons, as “weapons of terror rather than part of the conventional military
arsenal.” David S. McDonough, Nuclear Superiority or Mutually Assured Deterrence—The
Development of the US Nuclear Deterrent, 60 CAN. INT’L COUNCIL: INT’L J. 811, 812 (2005).
Nevertheless, hesitation to include nuclear weapons in national security strategy was as likely
based on the “scarcity of atom bombs and the limited range of the delivery vehicle (the B-29
bombers)” as the apparent lack of necessity for nuclear weapons strategy (due to U.S. nuclear
monopoly) or even the moral disinclination of U.S. leadership. Id.
95. Harold A. Feiveson & Ernst Jan Hogendoorn, No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,
NONPROLIFERATION REV., Summer 2003, at 1, 2.
96. Id.
97. McDonough, supra note 94, at 814.
98. Id. at 815.
99. Harold & Hogendoorn, supra note 95.
100. See id.
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The second Bush Administration came into power with President
George W. Bush being a supporter of right-wing sentiment concerning
the status of the CTBT. (From the perspective of a campaigning Bush,
“We can fight the spread of nuclear weapons, but we cannot wish them
away with unwise treaties.”101) Moreover, right-wing senators did not
believe the treaty was in the interest of the United States and had no
intention of promoting a Senate reconsideration of the treaty. 102
Additionally, the Administration had some ideas, reflected in the 2002
NPR, concerning strategic innovations regarding the deployment of
nuclear arsenals. Their major innovation in nuclear policy was the
development of a nuclear global strike option.103 Quite clearly, the idea of
a global strike option runs counter to the restraint that had been reflected
in the developing treaty law as well as developing international public
opinion in this area.
The second Bush Administration also sought to promote the
development of a newer strategic class of nuclear weapons. These were
styled as mini-nukes and bunker-buster nukes—the latter presumably for
the purposes of targeting global terrorism. 104 This approach of the
Administration coming on the defeat of the CTBT, as well as its
unwillingness to support it coming up again in the Senate, further
entrenched the signals that the United States was not particularly
interested in a multilateral, global approach to nuclear weapons problems.
The United States gave an indication of this approach by basing its
invasion of Iraq on the notion that it could invade a rogue state—
unilaterally—if that rogue state was developing a threatened arsenal of
nuclear weapons.
The approach of the G.W. Bush Administration tended to
marginalize the importance of international law as developed via the
treaty-making process or the clarifications generated from authoritative
sources such as the ICJ or, indeed, the U.N. itself. The expectation of
obfuscation with regard to the U.S. position on the developing
international law in this field have increased fears of global insecurity
101. Interfaith Questionnaire on Elimination of Nuclear Weapons: US Presidential
Candidates’ Responses, ACRONYM INST. FOR DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY, Sept. 2000,
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd50/50views.htm. Then-Governor Bush was responding to this
question: “There are interim steps to take in the quest for the elimination of nuclear weapons.
For example, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty provides a means of controlling the spread of
nuclear weapons. If elected President, will you seek ratification of the CTBT by the United
States Senate?” Id.
102. See Nagan & Slemmens, supra note 91, at 29.
103. See id. at 62.
104. See Feiveson & Hogendoorn, supra note 92, at 5.
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causing some states to believe that the surest way to deter a U.S.-led
invasion is to have some sort of nuclear device as a defense of last resort.
Such states pin their security expectations on the unpredictability of their
defense posture as a way of deterring a possible regime change action on
the part of the United States.
To appreciate the impact of the G.W. Bush Administration’s
approach to the problem of the nation’s nuclear weapons posture, recall
that the Administration inherited the decision of the Clintonian Senate to
obstruct the CTBT. Building on the CTBT’s demise, the Administration
gave an indication of its approach to the problem of nuclear weapons
policy in its Nuclear Posture Review of 2002, which represented a radical
shift from preexisting U.S. policy. The approach suggested a prioritization of the traditional value of credible deterrence and a contemplation of
future security threats that would require a more flexible and credible
nuclear deterrence posture. The central elements of this posture were
driven by the concern that the Department of Defense had no effective
tool to attack enemy assets that were buried in deep earth and concrete
bunkers. Thus, there was a particular interest in developing “bunker
busters” and in particular, the possibility of arming bunker busters with
“mini-nukes.”105
The idea of mini-nukes is tied to the idea that if mini-nukes can be
developed with less environmentally destructive effects, such weapons
would significantly increase the flexibility of their deployment, and this
would increase the credibility of deterrence. What this implied was that
research needed to be done for the development of tactical nuclear
arsenals that could be much more easily integrated into the conventional
armory of the nation so that their use would be routinized in terms of
defense capability.
This would require a completely new warhead design, and, indeed,
it would also require a new round of testing of such weapons. In this
regard, the Bush Administration maintained publicly the U.S. moratorium
on nuclear testing and at the same time resisted any notion of supporting
the adoption of the CTBT.106 Along with these positions, there was also
the development of a nuclear global strike option. This principle should
perhaps be understood in light of the articulate Bush Doctrine in the War
on Terror. In that doctrine, the President argued for a preemptive right to

105. See id.
106. See Nagan & Slemmens, supra note 91, at 4.

2010]

U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY

29

self-defense,107 and thus the global strike option would effectually find a
place in the officially articulated New Bush Doctrine.
The idea of developing low-yield nukes had been a matter that had
been talked about in the Administrations of both Presidents George H.W.
Bush and Clinton. Within the nuclear community, important policy
papers were written to the effect that the U.S. nuclear arsenal had no
deterrent effect on dictators like Saddam Hussein. The pro-nuclear lobby
therefore made the case that there was a defense need for flexible tactical
nuclear weapons to fill the vacuum in the deterrence posture. Dick
Cheney, in his report on defense strategy for the 1990s, argued for an
increased role for nuclear forces in tackling regional threats, and he
endorsed the development of new nonstrategic nuclear weapons.108
The Bush approach raised deep concerns internationally about the
interrelated arms control agreements and their currency under that
Administration. The central problem was the effect that Bush’s nuclear
strategy might have on the NPT. In 2000, the states parties to the NPT
agreed on thirteen practical steps toward global nuclear disarmament.
However, the Bush Administration’s plans contradicted several of those
agreed upon steps. For example, the 2000 NPT Review Conference
committed the nuclear powers to the principle of irreversibility
concerning nuclear disarmament. The parties also were committed to
“[a] diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to
minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate
the process of their total elimination.”109 However, shortly after the 2000
NPT Review Conference, the “first-use” policy articulated by the United
States at the previous 1995 NPT Review Conference was reaffirmed:
[T]he United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear weapon state parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of
107. Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The New Bush National Security Doctrine and
the Rule of Law, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 375, 407 (2004).
108. “In January 1991, as US forces were deployed to liberate Kuwait, Defense Secretary
Cheney issued the top-secret Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP), which formally
tasked the military to plan for nuclear operations against nations capable of developing WMD.”
Hans N. Kristensen, Nuclear Futures: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US
Nuclear Strategy 10 (British Am. Sec. Info. Council (BASIC), BASIC Research Report 98.2,
Mar. 1998) (citation omitted) (citing William M. Arkin, Agnosticism When Real Values Are
Needed: Nuclear Policy in the Clinton Administration, Federation of American Scientists Public
Interest Report, September/October 1994, p. 7.) [del “citing” parenthetical]. “This guidance
resulted in SIO-P93, the first overall nuclear war plan formally to incorporate Third World WMD
targets.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing USSTRATCOM, Strategic Planning Study, Final Report, 1
October 1993, p. 3-35 (partially declassified and released under the Freedom of Information Act))
[del “citing” parenthetical].
109. 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, Apr. 24-May 19, 2000, Final Document, at 15, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.2000/28 (2000).
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Nuclear Weapons, except in case of an invasion or any other attack on the
United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on
a state towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained
by such a non-nuclear weapon state in association or alliance with a
110
nuclear weapon state.

The position of the Bush Administration posed dangers for weakening
the legal and political force of the NPT. The attempt to develop new
flexible nuclear weapons and the refusal to rule out the use of nuclear
weapons against nonnuclear states raised a serious question about the
good faith of U.S. pledges under article VI of the NPT. Since the CTBT
has interlocking elements with the NPT, further research into the
development of mini-nuke warheads and a new generation of weapons
requiring testing would essentially end the U.S. unilateral ban on testing
and would radically depreciate the currency and efficacy of the CTBT.
The Bush opposition to the CTBT was a position that contrasted
with the closest allies of the United States. The legacy that President
George W. Bush left us is a nuclear policy that distances itself from
international agreement and international law and rely on nuclear
weapons systems as the basis of its nuclear policy. By rejecting the
CTBT, as well as irreversible arms reductions, and by seeking to develop
new more usable nuclear weapons in disregard for the NPT agenda, the
George W. Bush Administration presented genuine threats to the
development of international arms control institutions that have taken
years to be put into place. As the Obama Administration takes on issues
involved in the regulation of nuclear weapons, one of the most significant
challenges that the President confronts is to rebuild the foundations for
the NPT and the CTBT and to correct for his predecessor’s erosion of
those foundations.
VIII. CURRENT U.S. NUCLEAR ARMS POLICY
The current U.S. nuclear arms policy adheres to nuclear deterrence
while simultaneously pursuing a path toward complete nuclear
disarmament. Part IX will explain how the Obama Administration
arrived at such a position. It will also explain how the Administration
has justified (or will justify in the future) certain inconsistencies
necessarily resulting from this position.
In anticipating the Obama Administration’s NPR, many foresaw a
complete overhaul of U.S. National Security Doctrine and force
110. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Daily Press Briefing (Feb. 22, 2002), http://20012009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2002/8421.htm.
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considerations.111 Among the key issues under debate was whether the
primary purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack against the
United States or its allies. For example, Senator James M. Inhofe (ROkla.), a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
argued:
United States nuclear weapons must continue to deter not only nuclear
attacks but also chemical and biological attacks against the United States
and its allies. While some reduction in our nuclear arsenals may be
warranted, deep cuts would be destabilizing and would encourage other
112
countries to enter into nuclear competition.

Senator Inhofe correctly judges that in the post-Cold War world there is a
need for nuclear deterrence that is broader than a response to nuclear
threats,113 but would see national defense as ultimately resting on a far
more flexible and tactical design for nuclear arsenals to meet these new
threats.114
The Obama NPR was one of the most eagerly anticipated
documents in the area of national security—in part, because it reflects
the challenge of his vision for a world without nuclear weapons. The
challenge of the NPR was to develop strategic and tactical responses that
might move this agenda purposefully forward. Moreover, it was a
prelude to the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS). As instruments of
the official policy of the Executive, these two policy pieces affirm
important international law expectations. They also challenge certain
international law expectations and even some aspects of international law,
thus staking a claim to change or modify the relevant international law.
Although the NPR and the new NSS are unilateral U.S. undertakings,
they are communicated worldwide, and other states (and nonstates) will
react to them in predictable or unpredictable ways.
In the United States, it is an illustration of the President’s vision of
the future of nuclear arsenals. For this reason, many expressed
111. At this point, President Obama had already moved in negotiations with the Russians
on a new version of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991, which expired on December 5,
2009. President Obama had publically expressed his intentions in a speech in early April 2009.
Barack Obama, President of the United States, and Dmitriy Medvedev, President of Russia, Joint

Statement by President Dmitriy Medvedev of the Russian Federation and President Barack
Obama of the United States of America, April 1, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_
office/Joint-Statement-by-President-Dmitriy-Medvedev-of-the-Russian-Federation-andPresident-Barack-Obama-of-the-United-States-of-America.
112. Senator James M. Inhofe, Letter to the Editor, Nuclear Policy in a Changed World,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2010, at WK9.
113. “United States nuclear weapons must continue to deter not only nuclear attacks but
also chemical and biological attacks against the United States and its allies.” Id.
114. See id.
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disappointment when the NPR was issued, finding little change from
traditional U.S. nuclear posture.115 We disagree, however, with such a
wholly negative assessment. Below, we list some of the significant
changes (or decisions to adhere to traditional policies) found in the two
policy pieces, and we attempt to address the most pertinent critiques that
these points have received.
To differing extents, the NPR and NSS examined the following
issues:
-

The role of nuclear forces in the United States strategy planning and the
116
programming;
The United States nuclear deterrence policy (including targeting
strategy);
The policy requirements and objectives for the United States to
maintain a safe, reliable, and credible nuclear deterrence posture;
The role that missile defense capabilities and conventional strike forces
play in determining the role and size of nuclear forces;
The levels and composition of nuclear delivery systems that will be
required for implementing United States national and military strategy,
including any plans for replacing or modifying existing systems;
The type of active and inactive nuclear weapons stockpile that will be
required for implementing the United States national and military
strategy including any plans for replacing or modifying warheads;
The nuclear weapons complex that will be required for implementing
the United States national and military strategy, including any plans to
modernize or modify the complex;
117
The U.S. arms control objectives;
The importance of the international legal system in fulfilling U.S.
118
policy goals; and

115. See, e.g., Alexander Cockburn, Nuclear Disarmament: A Major Defeat, NATION,
May 17, 2010, at 9 (expressing strong disappointment in the revelations of the nuclear posture
review and their ineffectiveness at promoting the nuclear disarmament agenda). “The
administration did not merely reassert the essential premises of [U.S.] nuclear strategy but used
the publication of the review and the subsequent Nuclear Security Summit in Washington as
occasions to intensify threats against North Korea and Iran.” Id.
116. Because “there is no greater threat to the American people than weapons of mass
destruction, particularly the danger posed by the pursuit of nuclear weapons by violent extremists
and their proliferation to additional states,” the United States is “pursuing a comprehensive
nonproliferation and nuclear security agenda, grounded in the rights and responsibilities of
nations. We are reducing our nuclear arsenal and reliance on nuclear weapons, while ensuring the
reliability and effectiveness of our deterrent.” OBAMA, supra note 7, at 4.
117. “We are leading a global effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials from
terrorists.” Id.
118. “We are strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the foundation
of nonproliferation, while working through the NPT to hold nations like Iran and North Korea
accountable for their failure to meet international obligations.” Id.
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The deterrence policy that will reveal President Obama’s apparent
119
concern with the inhuman effects of using nuclear weapons.

While these issues do not explicitly account for the importance of
international legal process in the consideration of the policy options, they
have significantly illuminated the evolving position of U.S. nuclear arms
policy and ways in which this U.S. position intends to respond to (and
even direct) international law standards.
The U.S. President’s emphasis on international rule of law is a
positive method of addressing state outliers who refuse to engage in the
regulation of nuclear weapons by international law. The eventual goal of
complete nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved without first
commanding a globally unified position on nuclear weapons. In both the
media and international relations there have been major responses to the
inclusion of Israel among the NPT outliers named in the NPT Review
Report. Israel, of course, has nuclear weapons but has not signed the
NPT.120 The change in U.S. position regarding Israel’s maintenance of
nuclear weapons signals a comprehensive legal strategy to the Obama
Administration’s nuclear arms agenda. The move sends the message that
even close U.S. allies must conform to international legal standards, lest
they come under the shadow of dangerous U.S. nuclear posturing.
More distressing to the pursuit of a nuclear abolition agenda, the
NPR reaffirms U.S. dedication to NATO’s nuclear planning, which
inspires tension with U.S. obligations under article VI of the NPT to
negotiate on “effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms
race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.”121 As a key possessor
of nuclear weapons within NATO’s strategic nuclear protective stance,
the United States may need to redefine its role within NATO to conform
with this provision with the NPT. (Conformity may require merely the
elaboration of priorities within standing NATO agreements, making it
apparent that the protective strategies of NATO include the paramount
strategy of nuclear disarmament.) As one journalist effectively points out,
119. According to Cockburn:
The crucial sentence in the review, insistently repeated by Obama, states that “the
United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.”
Cockburn, supra note 115. Cockburn’s issue here is that the NPR, by emphasizing standing
obligations under the NPT, targets the few states who have not complied with these obligations
and issues to them a threat of “first use.” Id. (Cockburn would have preferred the adoption of a
“no first use” policy on nuclear weapons. Id.)
120. See Nagan & Slemmens, supra note 91, at 50, 90.
121. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 29, art. VI.
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“As of 2005, the United States was providing about 180 tactical B61
nuclear bombs for use by Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and
Turkey under these NATO agreements,” despite the fact that articles I and
II of the NPT prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons to nonnuclear
states.122 That journalist predicts little gain for the cause of nuclear
disarmament stemming from the impending redraft of NATO’s strategic
concept, noting that the last reformulation (in 1999) stated:
The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political . . .
to fulfill an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any
aggressor . . . . The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is
123
provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance.

Thus, the point is made again that the United States must bring
obligations under NATO in conformity with obligations under the NPT.
From what we now know, the Obama Administration is interested in
the developing lex specialis of international law relating to nuclear
weapons and has placed emphasis on diplomacy, negotiation, and finding
the space for common-interest activities in which law still plays an
important role. The importance of broadening the relevance of
international law via the lex specialis (as well as through general
international law) is that it broadens the scope of international obligation
and creates a normative system of global expectation that is inclusive. It
is in the interest of the United States that U.S. strategic and tactical
changes in the direction of reduced global nuclear threats should carry
the mantle of credibility that is completely consistent with global
normative priority. There is strong global support for arms reduction,
and in particular, a reduction of nuclear threats to global peace and
security. Thus, President Obama’s commitment to the vision of a world
bereft of nuclear weapons will have greater force if it is underlined by
international law and which carries the strength of global opinio juris. In
short, the NPR seizes upon those aspects of which there is evidence of
common interest consistent with the President’s declared policy aspiration.
In part, the credibility of the President’s policy directives in the
direction of nuclear disarmament must be tied to the role of science and
technology facilitating the task of reducing our nuclear arsenals. This in
itself is important for international law because law that is contextsensitive will provide us with guidelines that are useful in facilitating
these presidential goals.
122. Cockburn, supra note 115.
123. Id.
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The American Physical Society (APS) recently outlined a strategy
for the role of science and technology in facilitating nuclear disarmament.124 The APS underlines three essential tasks for the scientific
community:
1) verifying the process of downsizing and dismantling of stockpiles,
2) sustaining nuclear weapons capability and expertise for as long as is
necessary, and 3) removing the capabilities for reversals through various
confidence-building measures, in particular by ensuring the peaceful use of
125
fissile materials.

The APS recommends a number of important steps that it believes the
government should embrace. These steps include the declassification of
the number of all U.S. nuclear weapons, the establishment of
international centers for verification, research and validation, the
refurbishment of elements of the U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure, the
support of federal investment in key programs, and the establishment of
information sharing among nuclear related industries. 126 The report
concludes as follows:
We are confident that the development of the technology needed for a safe
and secure downsizing program for global nuclear arsenals is within our
reach if it is adequately supported. The associated operational and
doctrinal measures will require major investments as well. The technology
steps are clear; the structure of the overall program requires careful
127
assessment and ongoing support.

Since the nuclear weapons problem is one that deeply implicates
science and technology, modern international law must also come to
grips with the possibilities and limitations of science and technology in
order to provide the goal guidance that is both relevant and steeped in
realism. One of the central challenges of effective international law is
that it must avoid specious utopianism and focus contextually with
realism and discipline. From the brief discussion above, it is clear that
the stakeholders of international law must provide a better contextual
understanding of world order conditions and current security threats,
including the threats of terrorism. Such an approach permits us to get
past the doctrinal constraints of bipolar world order thinking and, at the
same time, permits us to focus more clearly on the nature of security
124. PANEL ON PUB. AFFAIRS, AM. PHYSICAL SOC’Y, TECHNICAL STEPS TO SUPPORT
NUCLEAR ARSENAL DOWNSIZING, http://www.aps.org/policy/reports/popa-reports/upload/nuclear
downsizing.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2010).
125. Id. at 3.
126. Id. at 5-22.
127. Id. at 23.
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threats, which may facilitate or limit the achievement of the goals of
nuclear disarmament. In addition, the nuclear weapons problem is one
that deeply implicates science and technology. A relevant role from
modern international law is to come to grips with the possibilities and
limitations of science and technology in order to provide the goal
guidance that is both relevant and steeped in realism.
X.

CONCLUSION

The legal status of nuclear weapons poses a difficult, classical
problem of the clash between law and effective power. It was this
juxtaposition that J.F. Dulles recognized when he suggested that the sheer
power of nuclear weapons represented a reality that transcended the
international law of the U.N. Charter.128 The control and management of
nuclear arsenals and how they are produced and deployed have been
matters over which there has been significant contention with the U.S.
government. Nuclear weapons are such a high priority for national
security matters that the high security issues implicated seem to be more
suited to decision making within the class of national security operatives.
The perspective of the national security operative draws on a tradition of
intellectual thought that sees international relations as largely a matter of
exclusively manipulating the national power posture of a state. Theorists
such as Morgenthau and Kennan expressed impatience with international
law having any important role in international relations involving
important security matters. In their view, international law was a
dangerous utopian artifact. 129 Its specialized language, which came
packaged with a culture of legalism, was irrelevant and possibly
dangerous to the appropriate management of foreign relations in a
nuclear age. Regrettably, their target of attack was an older version of
international law—one not influenced by functionalism or by contextsensitive analysis. It is this latter view of international law that has
demonstrated a capacity for realism, a challenge to unreflective
policymaking, and a willingness to clarify the appropriate role for law
broadly conceived in the control and regulation of nuclear weapons. In
this, it has succeeded in seeking to bring reason to bear on the possibly
unrestrained exercise of raw power, which could include the destructive
force of nuclear arsenals. In this sense, President Obama’s decision to
look to a world free of the threat of nuclear destruction is in keeping with

128. Dulles, supra note 14, at 1066.
129. See, e.g., MORGENTHAU, supra note 19, at 33.
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the tradition of law that insists on the importance of reason as an
appropriate limit on the unrestrained exercise of power.
While proceeding along a complex path toward the goal of
complete disarmament, confronting a concept of nuclear deterrence
infinitely broader than the contours of a bipolar world, the Obama
Administration presents an evolved position in U.S. nuclear arms
policy—one that directly engages with and directs the standards of
international law. Commanding a globally unified position on nuclear
weapons (while maintaining the framework of existing international
obligations that permits the world’s only superpower to act as the key
architect for nuclear engagement) signals a comprehensive legal strategy
to the Obama Administration’s nuclear arms agenda. President Obama
might successfully contribute to an outlawing of nuclear arms even as the
United States maintains the position of nuclear deterrence that the
President’s activities aim to establish as unlawful under international law.
As a former lawyer and legal scholar, President Obama seems to be using
effective strategies of both law and power to build a foundation of
international law that will support the process of complete nuclear
disarmament, even after this President no longer wields power.

